Wednesday, March 17, 2010

Notes on Judi Dench's Talk (Part 1)


Scribbled notes (Part 1) of Judi Dench's talk, 17 March 2010, Rose Theatre, Kingston, London. Facilitator: Stephen Unwin (Artistic Director, Rose Theatre)

SU: How did you start, this love for theatre?
JD: Initially studied to be a designer. At age seven, JD went to see her brother perform in 'the Scottish play'
She was excited he spoke the word, "Bloody" on stage. That was something she doesn't mind doing, uttering (what was then considered a 'bad' word), jumping up and down the sofa in delight when she returned home. She then went to watch her older brother, Jeffrey, perform in Taming of the Shrew. Jeffrey Dench has been an actor longer than she has.
Her house has been filled with Shakespeare just as some homes are filled with classical music. She has been exposed to Shakes since very young.

SU: How to encourage the youngsters to love theatre?
JD: Recently had a Saturday matinee for kids- they laughed at some places. Now if only they would remember the place (a theatre!) and where (& why?) they laughed...
JD: Nottingham Playhouse was the first theatre rep to reach West Africa, despite whatever Peter Brook says (laughter from the audience)
When they went back again to West Africa in 1969, a huge theatre movement was happening in Nigeria, Ghana & Sierra Leone.
SU: mentioned something about the reaction to theatre in West Africa as 'unvarnished response" (I like that phrase)

Next, (did JD suddenly go back to the first ques, about the beginnings of her love for theatre? I think SU guided her back to it)
JD mentioned watching an all-girl performance of Julius Caesar (when she was young) She thanked God she wasn't involved in it- if she did she wouldn't be interested to act at all. (laughter, of course, from the audience- she shivered in mock disgust as she told this story)

As a student, JD went to Stratford and she saw a fantastic set design which made her abandon her plan on doing set design. She had conventional thoughts of design- curtain goes up, curtain goes down, some set change happen behind curtain, curtain comes up again.
This production did not bring down any curtains. It was Michael Redgrave in King Lear.
So she did the next best thing: acting.

SU: So you followed what your brother (Jeffrey) did?
JD: Yes

On entering Central School of Speech & Drama, JD couldn't really remember if she had to audition. (So funny! She look perplexed- I really don't remember, she said)
JD remembered a written exam. Pause. Then she said she may be making this all up altogether (more titterings from audience)

JD: (As actors) We have to know we are pretending rather than believing (then made some gestures indicating she doesn't really believe in that- 'method' of acting?)
JD does takes the pretending deadly seriously. Deadly serious. (I sense the emphasis on that phrase) Deadly serious.

JD: When in the Vic, she, with other younger actors learnt on the wings of the stage. Nobody went off to the dressing room. All observed from the wings. That was her theatre education.
I learnt from everybody
SU: "Like a sponge"

JD: One thing she does is to watch a show in the theatre (repertory) she considered joining/acting in. Watch a show that's been performed last before the productionshe was supposed to be involved it That was what made her join the Vic.
JD: Check on the amount of energy required in the theatre, Check the last production, to get the measure of the theatre.

SU: Asked about her time in Stratford with Peter Hall in 1962
JD: It was thrilling, wonderful memories, Measure for Measure, Midsummers Night Dream

SU: JD is so lucky to be fully at work in ensemble/repertory as a 20 something actress during her time. (1960s, I presume?)
JD: (thoughtfully) Yes. As actor and understudy.
SU: It's harder nowadays, JD agreed. Repertory season is so expensive to put on, such as the present RSC.

SU: (broached the subject of teaching)
JD: Teaching? I don't like to teach. Not consciously teach. I can't teach. Masterclass frightens the hell out of me.
JD: I could (assist with?) an audition speech but I can't promise you'll get in (laughter)

SU: You directed. SU interjected: "Directing is hard" (I concur! directing is tiring okay, peeps! try it and you'll know!)
JD: Directing, is very hard (Hear! Hear! hehe...)
JD: I couldn't believe how transparent we (actors) are. She knew when one of her actors didn't spend time memorizing lines. "Why don't you spend, ahem, two hours learning the lines" (her posture changed, acting out her role as director, saw a glimpse of how she was as a director- I try to remember it, next time use it on you, 'transparent' actors, bwahaha)

JD directed Much Ado About Nothing, Kenneth Branagh was Benedick.
One day,she wanted to give notes to Ken- apparently straight after show, Branagh ran off (in his costume!) to avoid her!
And he copied all her ideas in his film of 'Much Ado' (She looks like joking but vestiges of indignation still there- I sense) (laughter from audience, of course)

SU: Tips to teach Shakes?
JD: As Trevor Nunn, Peter Hall always say, "Obey the verse". Now Derek Jacobi would say this is all rubbish. And he is a very good actor.
JD: You would run out of breath if you do not follow the verse
(To be continued in Part 2)

Sunday, January 10, 2010

New Statesman critcism of 'Consolations of Philosophy' by Alain de Botton


Comforting, but meaningless. In seeking to popularise philosophy, Alain de Botton has merely trivialised it, smoothing the discipline into a series of silly sound bites. By Edward Skidelsky
Edward Skidelsky
Published 27 March 2000
The Consolations of Philosophy Alain de Botton Hamish Hamilton, 320pp, £14.99 ISBN 0241140099
I don't want to be accused of intellectual snobbery when I say that The Consolations of Philosophy is a very bad book. It is bad not because it makes unsupported generalisations, fails to define its terms, or any of the other conventional academic failings. All these are perfectly legitimate in a work of popular philosophy. It is bad because the conception of philosophy that it promotes is a decadent one, and can only mislead readers as to the true nature of the discipline.
This is all the more dangerous because the decadent notion of philosophy as "consolation" is actually very close to the true conception of philosophy. Philosophy - and to this extent Alain de Botton is correct - is not something that can be separated from life itself. It is not something that you do between nine o'clock and five o'clock, after which point "life" - dinner parties and flirtation - resumes. Life is continually thrusting philosophical questions upon us, and our answers to those questions make demands upon life. What carries on in universities under the name of philosophy has only an accidental relation to philosophy itself, just as what carries on in church has only an accidental relation to religion.
Socrates is commonly revered as someone who took philosophy seriously, who lived and died according to its demands. He is to philosophy what Christ is to Christianity. Like Christ, Socrates was completely misunderstood by his contemporaries. They viewed his endless questions about the nature of justice and beauty as a kind of childish game, unconnected to the serious business of life. (This is how most people still see philosophy.) The truth, as Socrates said again and again, is precisely the opposite. These are the most serious and practical questions that anyone can ask; compared to them, the "serious business of life" is a childish game. Christ made a similar point when he described the Pharisees as men who "strain at a gnat and swallow a camel". The things that most people take seriously are in fact ludicrously trivial. In moments of lucidity or remorse, they perceive this but find it hard to keep the perception in mind. Hardest of all is to live according to this sense of what really matters, as the biographies of Socrates and Christ demonstrate.
This austere conception of philosophy is inverted by de Botton. For Socrates, philosophy makes demands on life; for de Botton, life makes demands on philosophy. Philosophical theories are no more than ointments that we apply to soothe our various ailments. A remark by Epicurus, on the back cover of the book, sums it up: "Any philosopher's argument which does not therapeutically treat human suffering is worthless, for just as there is no profit in medicine when it does not expel the diseases of the body, so there is no profit in philosophy when it does not expel the diseases of the mind."
Not only is this conception of philosophy decadent in the popular sense of being effete, but it is also decadent in the precise sense of belonging to a period of cultural decline. The Epicurean view of philosophy as therapy was shared by all the main schools of late antiquity. This was a period in which the material and spiritual resources of classical civilisation were running dry. Barbarians harassed the frontiers, while a swollen administration stifled civic life. Unemployed mobs congregated in the imperial capitals, and were pacified with bread and circuses. Creative literature gave way to rhetoric and pastiche, and the official religion declined into an empty cult. Frustrated and dispirited, the educated retired to their libraries and found consolation in philosophy.
If you rewrite the above description, substituting "welfare and football" for "bread and circuses", and "psychotherapy" for "philosophy", you gain an approximate portrait of the modern west. The idea of philosophy as therapy appeals today for the same reason it appealed in late antiquity: it promises respite from insoluble problems. Even within "serious" philosophy, the therapeutic paradigm has proved seductive. Wittgenstein saw an analogy between his method, in which philosophical problems are "dissolved" into linguistic misunderstandings, and Freudian psychoanalysis. And relativism is often commended on the grounds that it encourages a tolerant, chilled-out attitude to life - an argument that can be traced back to ancient scepticism.
This conception of philosophy is not only distasteful; it falsifies its object. The first virtue of a philosophical theory is truth, just as the first virtue of a law is justice. Truth and justice cannot be traded for anything less. If a philosophical theory is false, it must be rejected, no matter how many therapeutic benefits derive from believing it. If a law is unjust, it should be re- pealed, however salutary its political or economic consequences.
De Botton ignores this obvious truth. He recommends Schopenhauer's misanthropic theory of sexual love - the theory, in brief, that all sexual love is a delusion created by the biological imperative of reproduction - for no better reason than that it can help cheer you up after a failed seduction attempt. It is true that misanthropy can be cheering - Schopenhauer himself was essentially a cheerful person - but that is not a reason to espouse it. The function of philosophy is not to pander to wounded vanity.
De Botton attributes his therapeutic conception of philosophy to thinkers who would themselves have rejected it. Apart from Schopenhauer, he deals with Socrates, Epicurus, Seneca, Montaigne and Nietzsche. Of these six, only Epicurus and Seneca would have endorsed the notion that philosophy is therapy. Socrates would never have suggested philosophy as a "consolation for unpopularity", because he did not think of unpopularity as something for which one needed to be consoled. Philosophy does not console one for popularity: it makes one indifferent to it. Similarly, Nietzsche's philosophy is not a "consolation for difficulties"; it is, rather, an injunction to seek out and triumph over difficulties. In both cases, de Botton is using philosophical ideas in ways for which they were never originally intended.
But it is Montaigne who suffers the greatest indignity at the hands of de Botton. Montaigne's remark, "If man were wise, he would gauge the true worth of anything by its usefulness and appropriateness in his life", is glossed as "Only that which makes us feel better may be worth understanding". Not only is this a miserable conception of intellectual endeavour, it is quite clearly a misinterpretation of Montaigne. Something may be useful or appropriate in your life without necessarily making you feel better. Once again, philosophy has been surreptitiously corrupted into flattery.
The medical analogy is misleading in another way. Different medicines may be incompatible in their effects, but they cannot strictly be said to contradict one another. This is because medicine refers to nothing outside itself. Philosophical theories, on the other hand, make claims about the world, and these claims can come into conflict. By treating philosophical theories as medicines, you abolish any sense of conflict between them. A little Epicurus for your money worries goes quite nicely with a bit of Seneca for your frustrations; that Epicurus and Seneca disagree with one another hardly matters. Ultimately, you lose the sense that philosophy refers to anything beyond the human psyche and its needs. It is transformed into a series of sound bites, all equally comforting and equally meaningless.
Perhaps some readers will find de Botton endearing, with his cocoa, holiday snaps and sexual hang-ups. But I failed to be charmed by these autobiographical touches, because they seemed like a calculated attempt at ingratiation. Philosophy has clearly not helped de Botton overcome the "indiscriminate desire for affection" he admits to in the opening chapter. But perhaps it has provided consolation for it.
Edward Skidelsky's reviews appear monthly in the "NS"

Monday, January 4, 2010

New Montaigne Book by Sarah Bakewell (from Literay Review)


taken from Literary Review article

Frederic Raphael
MAN FOR ALL SEASONS
How to Live: A Life of Montaigne in One Question and Twenty Attempts at an Answer
By Sarah Bakewell (Chatto & Windus 370pp £16.99)
Michel Eyquem de Montaigne was born in 1533 and died (following an attack of kidney stones, like his father) in 1592. His mother was of Marrano descent; her family had been Sephardic Jews, forced into Catholicism. Montaigne himself was always formally obedient to the Church. 'Otherwise', he wrote, 'I could not keep myself from rolling about incessantly. Thus I have kept myself intact, without agitation or disturbance of conscience.' In this respect, he was somewhat the precursor of Evelyn Waugh, who said that, had he not been a Catholic, he would scarcely have been human. Montaigne, however, was a genial man of no officious piety; a dutiful mayor of Bordeaux, unaggressive lord of his modest Périgordin manor, and a courtier without grand ambition.

His essays advocated good-humoured acceptance of the vagaries of human life. For all his formal orthodoxy, he was a manifest sceptic: 'There is', he observed, 'no hostility that exceeds Christian hostility.' In practice, he preferred the Stoic amor fati to religious absolutism and abominated the righteous cruelty of those with undoubting convictions: 'It is putting a very high price on one's conjectures to have someone roasted alive on their account.' Sarah Bakewell takes this to be an allusion to the spate of witch-hunting which accompanied the religious wars, but it is no great stretch to see in it a reference to the ongoing series of autos-da-fé on the other side of the Pyrenees. For those who choose to read him so, Montaigne was a bit of a crypto-Jew.

Fearing 'chimeras and fantastic monstrosities', he recruited reason, wryness and literacy to allay their hold on him. He declined to be engaged on either savage side in the religious wars which were the contemporary signs of that France 'divisée en deux' that first split Catholics from Huguenots, later Jacobins from Girondins, and then Socialists from the Droite classique. He played a key, but diffident, part in bringing the Protestant Henri of Navarre to the French throne and, one guesses, encouraged the king's view that Paris was worth a Mass. At the same time, Montaigne observed that, however lofty the throne, 'we are still sitting only on our own rump'.

If, in his mature years, he was happy to withdraw to the tower room - what he called his 'arrière-boutique' - in his chateau (the lintel of its doorway only a forbidding five feet from the floor), he was never aloof from the world's dangers nor reluctant to savour its pleasures. It is said that, as a young blade, he practised debauchery, but refrained from it with his beautiful wife, Françoise, whose naked breasts were never revealed to him: he saw only her hands and face uncovered. He made love to her, he dares to concede, 'with only one buttock'. Like his mother, Françoise outlived him, by many years. He gives neither woman a flattering press, but for Sarah Bakewell to say that they somehow drove him to his death is unworthy.

Montaigne's father, Pierre, played a key part in his formation. An opinionated, perhaps somewhat abrupt man, he insisted that 'Micheau' learn Latin as his first language and had small faith in formal schooling. While Ovid's Metamorphoses chimed with Montaigne's mutability and primed his imagination, Bakewell thinks him 'cheeky' for saying that Virgil's Aeneid 'might have been brushed up a bit'. In fact, Virgil himself (and not a few critics) thought the same thing; hence his wish for the poem to be destroyed after his death.

Pierre Montaigne triggered his son's literary life when, probably in 1567, he handed Micheau a 500-page Latin manuscript, the Theologia Naturalis, sive liber creaturarum, written over a century earlier by the Catalan Catholic apologist Raymond Sebond, and said (in Bakewell's words), 'Translate this into French for me when you get a moment, will you, son?'

Montaigne's almost book-length assessment of Sebond's work became the centrepiece of the second volume of his Essais. Sainte-Beuve regarded this seemingly deferential analysis as a covert attack on Christianity. As Joseph Epstein reminds us, in an elegant and succinct essay, Montaigne had a prescient word to say about such deconstruction: 'Once you start digging down into a piece of writing, there is simply no slant or meaning ... which the human mind cannot find there.' In our own time, as the Janus-faced Paul de Man would prove, bad faith and critical ingenuity often go hunting together.

How to Live: A Life of Montaigne in One Question and Twenty Attempts at an Answer is a lively, well-sourced account of the man and the work. Bakewell is tellingly accurate when she comes to the savage instability of sixteenth-century provincial life. Catholics and Huguenots, neighbours and friends, were inspired to slaughter each other with pitiless self-righteousness. Bordeaux was the scene of exemplary massacres and vindictive repressions, in which Montaigne strove, with no little courage and some success, to play a reconciling role.

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Courageous but never pugnacious, except in self-advocacy, his sense of his own fragility and his innate tolerance warned him against what Byron (a somewhat kindred spirit, who also pampered his own inner divisions) called 'enthusymusy': over-keen religious partisanship. Two centuries later, Talleyrand (another Périgordin grandee) would counsel young diplomats to avoid 'trop de zèle' and played the Bishop of Bray, so to speak, with similar, but much more cynical, versatility.

Montaigne's want of dogmatic rigour, his willingness to settle for a good life this side of the grave, earned him the ardent reproaches of both Pascal and Descartes and, in time, the anathemas of the Church (once on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum, the essays were not reprieved until the mid-nineteenth century). He always did his duty, in pious and political terms, but his abiding pleasures were mundane and country-gentlemanly. His contemporary, Justus Lipsius, called him 'the French Thales'; but Montaigne would never, I suspect, have fallen into a well, as Thales supposedly did, while staring at the heavens. Micheau always watched his step with some care.

His eccentric schooling allowed him to pillage Latin literature with facility (if not always with precision) and to embrace Plutarch and Greek philosophy, although not in the language in which they were written. He indulged his cacoethes scribendi without restraint, but said that he would 'hate a reputation for being clever at writing, but stupid at everything else'. His essays were a reminiscential ramble around the estate of literature, issuing in what he termed 'des excréments d'un vieil esprit'. Self-portraiture and self-caricature regularly punctured his own seigneurial complacency.

Bakewell's well-sourced, spritely and anecdotal book does not benefit from being dressed as some sort of self-help manual. She gets off to a trendy start by recommending Theodore Zeldin's website The Oxford Muse (oh dear!), which invites self-revelation from 'all and sundry' as a means towards 'replacing national stereotypes with real people'. The site, we are promised (or should that be 'threatened'?), contains essays with 'titles like' - meaning, I suppose, such as - 'Why an educated Russian works as a cleaner in Oxford'. This preliminary digression may pay tribute to Bakewell's mentor, but it has little to do with Montaigne. I doubt if the exploratory self-centredness at the heart of his genius would choose to be associated with Zeldin's collation of brief lives.

Montaigne's shortest answer to the question 'how to live?' would probably be the banal recommendation to take it easy. His meandering answers are much more interesting and more diverting than any sound-bitten moral nostrum. Carpe diem, the Epicurean motto, is best honoured by caressing the quotidian details and appreciating the ordinary. Montaigne responded, prophylactically, to Heidegger's vision of man as living 'towards death' by advising against thinking too much about it. The variety of life on earth (not least that of the domestic animals with whom we play and who, Montaigne suspected, play with us) was an advertisement for unaffected pursuits, as against 'super-celestial' apprehensions or apocalyptic hopes.

Bakewell does not mention that he also said that, in the final confrontation with death, there was no sense in feigning. In extremis, Montaigne insisted, 'Il faut parler français.' The punning implication being that when it came to honest expression (franchise), the vernacular alone could provide a specific against cant. There is a sly hint here that the consolations of religion, which he received on his pain-filled deathbed, were not entirely to his taste.

Bakewell is properly dubious about the too clever notion that Etienne de la Boétie's precocious 'Discours de la servitude volontaire' was actually written by Montaigne himself and subsequently wished on his beloved friend (who died young, of the plague, with Micheau in close attendance), because he feared being taken for a dangerous revolutionary. La Boétie, under whose statue in Sarlat we often park our car, had a clear, brave voice of his own. His attack on tyranny and its spineless apparatchiks is a classic of virile provincial outspokenness.

Montaigne is, in truth, an entertaining companion rather than a therapist or a prototypical Miss Lonelyhearts. When Sarah Bakewell frees herself from the formulaic frame into which she has elected (or agreed) to be compressed, she is a generous, well-informed guide, not least to the afterlife of Montaigne's Essays, which leaked into Shakespeare, thanks to John Florio's English translation, and later inspired William Hazlitt. Montaigne's admirer Nietzsche's title 'human, all too human' is one that Micheau might have been happy to adopt. He (rather than the self-important Sir Thomas More) was, and remains, my man for all seasons.

Frederic Raphael is finishing a novel called 'Final Demands' (the third in his 'The Glittering Prizes' trilogy), to be published in the spring.

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

The Conductor Reflects


The Conductor Reflects
By DAVID MERMELSTEIN
from wsj.com


Few conductors can effortlessly invoke the Scriptures, Shakespeare, Goethe and Joseph Campbell in a preperformance lecture. None can do it as unpretentiously as David Robertson. Now in his fifth season as music director of the Saint Louis Symphony Orchestra, the American-born Mr. Robertson has raised to new heights the standing of this venerable, though not always lauded, ensemble. The relationship has also brought him belated renown in his homeland, well after he found fame in Europe, most notably with the Ensemble Intercontemporain in Paris.

Wednesday night, Mr. Robertson and his orchestra return to New York's Carnegie Hall, continuing an annual tradition, this time as part of the hall's "Ancient Paths, Modern Voices" festival, which juxtaposes music by Chinese composers with Western scores inspired by the Middle Kingdom. The program pairs recent works by the Chinese-born composers Tan Dun and Bright Sheng with Stravinsky's "Song of the Nightingale" and Bartók's "Miraculous Mandarin" Suite.

Mr. Robertson, age 51, was widely reported to have been a leading candidate for the music directorships of the New York Philharmonic and the Chicago Symphony Orchestra recently, and many have wondered how long he will remain in St. Louis. His annually renewed contract, currently valid through the 2011-12 season, is more typical of music directors nearing the end of their tenures. But he maintains that such details lend no insights into his commitment.

"I've never looked at anything I do as a stepping stone to someplace else," Mr. Robertson said while comfortably settled on a sofa in his bright, homey office at Powell Hall, a converted movie palace that has been the orchestra's home since 1968. "When you commit to a relationship, it's because the relationship makes both of you better."

Though the SLSO is the second-oldest such ensemble in America (the New York Philharmonic is the oldest), it has had more than its share of troubles recently—including a near bankruptcy in 2001, the sudden incapacitation of its previous music director in 2002, a strike by musicians in 2005 and, most recently, a sharp decline in the value of an endowment established to help stabilize the orchestra.

Mr. Robertson, though, decided that other things mattered more, noting that he found the organization unusually committed to civic concerns—a spirit that echoed the priorities of the European groups with which he had forged his reputation. "They give close to 300 community concerts versus 75 in Powell Hall," he said of his players. "And they didn't cut those when they had problems, which said to me this orchestra has its heart in the right place."

The conductor consistently underplays his artistic achievements here, preferring to credit his musicians with their mutual accomplishments. "I do like a challenge," he said. "But I like challenges that I know are attainable. The greatness in this orchestra is right there, so I didn't need to build it. They don't bring their egos onto the stage, just their creativity. And that's a huge, huge plus."

He likens his own duties to that of a "complex mirror" and suggests that musical inspiration comes from three sources: the composer, the musicians and the audience. "My job," he said, "is to reflect and refract these different beams of inspiration to the various parties in the right proportions."

And thanks to a new recording on Nonesuch of music by John Adams—the orchestra's first CD for a major label since the mid-1990s—Mr. Robertson's achievements in St. Louis can now be heard beyond the concert hall. The album features two works, "Guide to Strange Places" and "Doctor Atomic Symphony," the latter a reworking of themes from Mr. Adams's most recent opera. Both were recorded live at Powell Hall last year, giving listeners an especially good sense of how this ensemble sounds under its current music director.

"You're hearing the way this orchestra plays on the concert platform," the conductor said of the recording. "It's just like I imagine the score in my head, with the same passion and excitement, but also with individual personalities expressed. It's like recognizing someone's voice on the telephone. That was how it used to be when the orchestra was making lots of recordings, and it's nice to have that quality again with so many new players."

In April, Mr. Robertson takes the SLSO on a four-city California tour, with stops in Los Angeles and San Francisco. The experience will be a homecoming of sorts for the conductor, who was born and schooled in Santa Monica. "You have something nice, you want to share it," he said, before mentioning St. Louis's most famous symbol. "I can't take the arch on tour, so I'll take the Saint Louis Symphony Orchestra, which is equally wonderful."

The pairing prompts another comment, one that cuts to the heart of Midwestern self-deprecation and, perhaps, an inferiority complex. "You know," Mr. Robertson continued, "it takes somebody from outside St. Louis to come and say, 'This arch is one of the most inspiring objects in the world.' Only then do people from here say, 'Yeah, so it is.' And it's the same with the symphony. Only after outsiders praise it do people here go, 'Oh, yeah, so it is.' And that's part of our challenge—to get people here to realize just how amazing this thing is that's right in their midst."

—Mr. Mermelstein writes for the Journal on classical music and film.

Sunday, May 10, 2009

Snark Attack: The New Yorker's David Denby campaigns against "low, teasing, snide, condescending" criticism


by Michael C. Moynihan | April 6, 2009

Snark: It’s Mean, It’s Personal, and It’s Ruining Our Conversation, by David Denby, New York: Simon and Shuster, 144 pages, $15.95

Not long ago, New Yorker film critic David Denby had an epiphany: American culture was being debased by “snark,” that “low, teasing, snide, condescending, knowing” style of criticism, a “bad kind of invective” that’s “spreading like pinkeye through the national conversation” and proliferating on the Internet. Denby received this revelation while enjoying a “pan-Pacific dinner” with the political journalist Michael Kinsley. “Somewhere between the Singing Fish Satay and the Pow Wok Lamb,” he writes, “Mike and I...said more or less the same thing—that snark was becoming the characteristic discourse of our time.”

The byproduct of this conversation is a pungent and angry little book called Snark: It’s Mean, It’s Personal, and It’s Ruining Our Conversation. In just over 100 pages, alongside the first-name references to his famous friends and descriptions of his high-class meals, Denby attacks the online boobeoise who, he argues, have altered the tone of debate by supplanting thoughtful conversation with snide and indiscriminant denunciations of the “douchebags” with whom they disagree. “In a media society,” he writes, “snark is an easy way of seeming smart.” If the bloggers at Gawker and Wonkette, two websites dedicated to all things snarky, delight in puncturing the pretentions of the old-guard bourgeois intelligentsia, Denby has provided them a slow-moving target.

In a condensed history of snark, Denby relies on odd examples from the distant past—a pointless diversion, for instance, into Lewis Carroll’s nonsense poem “The Hunting of the Snark,” which has nothing to do with snark in its current meaning—and a fevered denunciation of various celebrity gossip websites and presidential campaign ads. While he rightfully credits the British satire magazine Private Eye and its American progeny Spy as snark trailblazers, he omits mention of Grand Royale, Suck, and Vice, all far more influential in establishing the tone of modern Internet snark.

It’s likely that those publications are unfamiliar to Denby, and his brief backgrounder on snark’s roots seems perfunctory—little more than a way to pad an essay into a small book that meanders towards the targets that really outrage him. For an idea of just what motivated Denby to attack an ephemeral style like snark, search for his name at Gawker, a media gossip site. Read the stories there about Denby’s “pornography addiction,” which he chronicled in his book Suckered, and the declaration that “we [have] come to hate David Denby.” For a great majority of Denby’s years as a professional writer, he was effectively firewalled from his critics. In the Age of the Internet, hipster bloggers are baying for the fusty critic’s blood.

Denby wants things as they once were, when American culture was effectively a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; when the Ivy League guardians of “our conversation” ruthlessly protected it from contamination by the jealous and uncouth. “Whatever its miseries, the country in the thirties and forties was at peace with itself spiritually: We were all in the same boat,” he argues. Today we have “income inequalities and Rovian tactics that exacerbate ethnic and class differences”; then we merely had Nazism and the Depression.

It seems unnecessary to observe that in the 1930s, when unemployment was in double digits and Father Coughlin commanded a rather large radio audience, both poverty and dirty politics were not entirely uncommon. And long before the Internet existed, such lurid and sleazy magazines as Police Gazette, Confidential, and Broadway Brevities sold millions of copies a week.

It’s just that the readers couldn’t get at you.

There is nothing new in the use of brutal sarcasm and ad hominems to attack your enemies. What Denby laments is the way technology has empowered the snarky critic to take shots at the powerful and influential, allowing the democratization of published cruelty. As Denby writes, snark is “the weapon of outsiders who want to displace the insiders.” True enough, but the reader can only wonder why a film critic at The New Yorker is troubled by nugatory attempts of “snarky pipsqueaks,” as he calls them, to challenge the professional critics.

Anyone who has been exposed to the subliterate animosities and grudges of the cruder anonymous commenters or bloggers, or has bristled at the lowered bar of what passes as clever satire on snark-heavy websites, will have some sympathy for Denby's effort to attack against the “everyone-sucks-but-me” culture. But his bizarre choice of targets and imprecise definition of “snarky” derails his argument from the beginning. At its core, Snark is a deeply political book and, therefore, Denby offers special dispensations for a Right On!–variety of ideological snark. “Snark is irresistible,” he writes, when discussing our previous president (and who could disagree with that?), but it apparently becomes gauche when directed at Democrats peddling hope and change. A large chunk of his argument is ceded to score-settling and a post-election outpouring of anger against those who said impolite things about Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. (Denby may be the only writer alive who would describe Sarah Palin's description of Barack Obama as “palling around with terrorists” as snarky.)

Denby tags the Fox News screamer Bill O’Reilly as a boorish knuckle-dragger, but his liberal counterpart Keith Olbermann is something else entirely: “One can’t help but noticing...that Olbermann’s tirades are voluminously factual, astoundingly syntactical...and always logically organized.” The leftist writer Gore Vidal is a “master of high snark,” while his conservative counterpart Tom Wolfe is an overrated racist. If you agree with the snark, it probably isn’t snark.

Denby identifies Wolfe’s “Radical Chic” as a progenitor of today’s snarky style, but it fails, he says, because the writer’s teasing of haute-liberal infatuation with the Black Panthers “now seems more fatuous than the assembled partygoers.” How so? Because according to Denby, “In the end, [Wolfe’s trademark] white suit may have been less an ironic joke than the heraldic uniform of a man born in Richmond, Virginia, who entertained fancies of a distinguished Old South in which blacks kept their mouths shut, a conservative who had never accustomed himself to the new money in the Northeast.” While denouncing bloggers for rumor-mongering and for besmirching reputations with nothing but conjecture, Denby nevertheless finds it appropriate to imply that Wolfe’s writing is steeped in white supremacy.

Denby accuses many of his targets of employing racist language in the service of snark, but often draws the wrong conclusions from his provided anecdotes. On the anonymous Internet, socially taboo topics like race become topics of humor, motivated both by racist belief and an attempt at finding the subversive in the forbidden. To the captains of snark, like those who produce Vice and The Onion—whose readers, incidentally, skew heavily into the Obama-voter demographic—racially-tinged jokes concurrently poke fun at the idiocies of the racism and the restrictions of the P.C. culture in which they were raised.

On top of the boorish jokes, Denby argues, it is also problematic that those reckless bloggers and snarky columnists don’t act like real journalists, don’t make phone calls to verify details about those they attack, and “ignore the routine responsibilities of journalism.” (Incidentally, in the paperback edition, Denby might note that Wonkette is not “written by young women” and is not owned by Gawker Media.) To Denby there is no separation between humorous commentary and journalism.

In a short, bitter denunciation of New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd—whose politics are generally agreeable to him—Denby bemoans her lack of seriousness. Her articles ripped the Bush administration, but they were too jokey and didn’t “come close to an adequate critique of power.” Her attacks on Hillary Clinton “seemed eager to punish Hillary for her ambitions, as if deep down she were alarmed by the idea of a woman making so great a claim for herself.” At this point, Denby seems priggish and humorless, and the reader comes close to simply telling him to lighten up, rather than explaining that Dowd is a satirist, not a sexist political scientist.

And while Denby exclaims that he “would love to take the good-guy, libertarian position” and allow the market of low-brow ideas to weed-out the cruel and profane, this opposite seems to be happening. So is it British-style libel legislation that is needed? Denby says he can’t be a libertarian on the issue, yet, elsewhere in the book, he admits that prosecuting bloggers and commenters under a hate speech–type law would offend his values as a defender of free speech. Indeed, he knows what he doesn’t like, he can identify the problem, but other than publishing a book, offers no suggestions as to how an army of Denbys might rollback the culture of snark.

The best he can offer is the hope that Obama's election will tone down the shrill and excitable corners of the Internet: “Whatever else the rise of Barack Obama means, it certainly suggests that...the college-educated...have become eager to reject shallow cynicism and to embrace hope in the public sphere—and...to take power and change the tone of public discourse.”

But snark predated George Bush and it will surely exist after George Bush. As the author Colson Whitehead recently put it, “Something bad happens, like 9/11, it’s the death of irony. Something good happens, like Obama’s win, it’s the death of irony.” Or the death of snark. But snark, like irony, isn't going anywhere, and will likely continue to fuel many more Michael Kinsley-hosted Singing Fish Satay dinners for years to come.

Michael Moynihan is a senior editor of Reason

Saturday, April 25, 2009

The Revenge of Geography


People and ideas influence events, but geography largely determines them. To understand the coming struggles, it's time to dust off the Victorian thinkers who knew the physical world best.(Article from foreignpolicy.com)A journalist who has covered the ends of the Earth offers a guide to the relief map—and a primer on the next phase of conflict.

The Revenge of Geography by Robert D. Kaplan
Illustration by Aaron Goodman for FP

When rapturous Germans tore down the Berlin Wall 20 years ago it symbolized far more than the overcoming of an arbitrary boundary. It began an intellectual cycle that saw all divisions, geographic and otherwise, as surmountable; that referred to “realism” and “pragmatism” only as pejoratives; and that invoked the humanism of Isaiah Berlin or the appeasement of Hitler at Munich to launch one international intervention after the next. In this way, the armed liberalism and the democracy-promoting neoconservatism of the 1990s shared the same universalist aspirations. But alas, when a fear of Munich leads to overreach the result is Vietnam—or in the current case, Iraq.

And thus began the rehabilitation of realism, and with it another intellectual cycle. “Realist” is now a mark of respect, “neocon” a term of derision. The Vietnam analogy has vanquished that of Munich. Thomas Hobbes, who extolled the moral benefits of fear and saw anarchy as the chief threat to society, has elbowed out Isaiah Berlin as the philosopher of the present cycle. The focus now is less on universal ideals than particular distinctions, from ethnicity to culture to religion. Those who pointed this out a decade ago were sneered at for being “fatalists” or “determinists.” Now they are applauded as “pragmatists.” And this is the key insight of the past two decades—that there are worse things in the world than extreme tyranny, and in Iraq we brought them about ourselves. I say this having supported the war.
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So now, chastened, we have all become realists. Or so we believe. But realism is about more than merely opposing a war in Iraq that we know from hindsight turned out badly. Realism means recognizing that international relations are ruled by a sadder, more limited reality than the one governing domestic affairs. It means valuing order above freedom, for the latter becomes important only after the former has been established. It means focusing on what divides humanity rather than on what unites it, as the high priests of globalization would have it. In short, realism is about recognizing and embracing those forces beyond our control that constrain human action—culture, tradition, history, the bleaker tides of passion that lie just beneath the veneer of civilization. This poses what, for realists, is the central question in foreign affairs: Who can do what to whom? And of all the unsavory truths in which realism is rooted, the bluntest, most uncomfortable, and most deterministic of all is geography.

Indeed, what is at work in the recent return of realism is the revenge of geography in the most old-fashioned sense. In the 18th and 19th centuries, before the arrival of political science as an academic specialty, geography was an honored, if not always formalized, discipline in which politics, culture, and economics were often conceived of in reference to the relief map. Thus, in the Victorian and Edwardian eras, mountains and the men who grow out of them were the first order of reality; ideas, however uplifting, were only the second.

And yet, to embrace geography is not to accept it as an implacable force against which humankind is powerless. Rather, it serves to qualify human freedom and choice with a modest acceptance of fate. This is all the more important today, because rather than eliminating the relevance of geography, globalization is reinforcing it. Mass communications and economic integration are weakening many states, exposing a Hobbesian world of small, fractious regions. Within them, local, ethnic, and religious sources of identity are reasserting themselves, and because they are anchored to specific terrains, they are best explained by reference to geography. Like the faults that determine earthquakes, the political future will be defined by conflict and instability with a similar geographic logic. The upheaval spawned by the ongoing economic crisis is increasing the relevance of geography even further, by weakening social orders and other creations of humankind, leaving the natural frontiers of the globe as the only restraint.

So we, too, need to return to the map, and particularly to what I call the “shatter zones” of Eurasia. We need to reclaim those thinkers who knew the landscape best. And we need to update their theories for the revenge of geography in our time.

If you want to understand the insights of geography, you need to seek out those thinkers who make liberal humanists profoundly uneasy—those authors who thought the map determined nearly everything, leaving little room for human agency.

One such person is the French historian Fernand Braudel, who in 1949 published The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. By bringing demography and nature itself into history, Braudel helped restore geography to its proper place. In his narrative, permanent environmental forces lead to enduring historical trends that preordain political events and regional wars. To Braudel, for example, the poor, precarious soils along the Mediterranean, combined with an uncertain, drought-afflicted climate, spurred ancient Greek and Roman conquest. In other words, we delude ourselves by thinking that we control our own destinies. To understand the present challenges of climate change, warming Arctic seas, and the scarcity of resources such as oil and water, we must reclaim Braudel’s environmental interpretation of events.

So, too, must we reexamine the blue-water strategizing of Alfred Thayer Mahan, a U.S. naval captain and author of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. Viewing the sea as the great “commons” of civilization, Mahan thought that naval power had always been the decisive factor in global political struggles. It was Mahan who, in 1902, coined the term “Middle East” to denote the area between Arabia and India that held particular importance for naval strategy. Indeed, Mahan saw the Indian and Pacific oceans as the hinges of geopolitical destiny, for they would allow a maritime nation to project power all around the Eurasian rim and thereby affect political developments deep into Central Asia. Mahan’s thinking helps to explain why the Indian Ocean will be the heart of geopolitical competition in the 21st century—and why his books are now all the rage among Chinese and Indian strategists.

Similarly, the Dutch-American strategist Nicholas Spykman saw the seaboards of the Indian and Pacific oceans as the keys to dominance in Eurasia and the natural means to check the land power of Russia. Before he died in 1943, while the United States was fighting Japan, Spykman predicted the rise of China and the consequent need for the United States to defend Japan. And even as the United States was fighting to liberate Europe, Spykman warned that the postwar emergence of an integrated European power would eventually become inconvenient for the United States. Such is the foresight of geographical determinism.

But perhaps the most significant guide to the revenge of geography is the father of modern geopolitics himself—Sir Halford J. Mackinder—who is famous not for a book but a single article, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” which began as a 1904 lecture to the Royal Geographical Society in London. Mackinder’s work is the archetype of the geographical discipline, and he summarizes its theme nicely: “Man and not nature initiates, but nature in large measure controls.”

His thesis is that Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia are the “pivot” around which the fate of world empire revolves. He would refer to this area of Eurasia as the “heartland” in a later book. Surrounding it are four “marginal” regions of the Eurasian landmass that correspond, not coincidentally, to the four great religions, because faith, too, is merely a function of geography for Mackinder. There are two “monsoon lands”: one in the east generally facing the Pacific Ocean, the home of Buddhism; the other in the south facing the Indian Ocean, the home of Hinduism. The third marginal region is Europe, watered by the Atlantic to the west and the home of Christianity. But the most fragile of the four marginal regions is the Middle East, home of Islam, “deprived of moisture by the proximity of Africa” and for the most part “thinly peopled” (in 1904, that is).

This Eurasian relief map, and the events playing out on it at the dawn of the 20th century, are Mackinder’s subject, and the opening sentence presages its grand sweep:

When historians in the remote future come to look back on the group of centuries through which we are now passing, and see them fore-shortened, as we to-day see the Egyptian dynasties, it may well be that they will describe the last 400 years as the Columbian epoch, and will say that it ended soon after the year 1900.

Mackinder explains that, while medieval Christendom was “pent into a narrow region and threatened by external barbarism,” the Columbian age—the Age of Discovery—saw Europe expand across the oceans to new lands. Thus at the turn of the 20th century, “we shall again have to deal with a closed political system,” and this time one of “world-wide scope.”

Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will [henceforth] be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence.

By perceiving that European empires had no more room to expand, thereby making their conflicts global, Mackinder foresaw, however vaguely, the scope of both world wars.

Mackinder looked at European history as “subordinate” to that of Asia, for he saw European civilization as merely the outcome of the struggle against Asiatic invasion. Europe, he writes, became the cultural phenomenon it is only because of its geography: an intricate array of mountains, valleys, and peninsulas; bounded by northern ice and a western ocean; blocked by seas and the Sahara to the south; and set against the immense, threatening flatland of Russia to the east. Into this confined landscape poured a succession of nomadic, Asian invaders from the naked steppe. The union of Franks, Goths, and Roman provincials against these invaders produced the basis for modern France. Likewise, other European powers originated, or at least matured, through their encounters with Asian nomads. Indeed, it was the Seljuk Turks’ supposed ill treatment of Christian pilgrims in Jerusalem that ostensibly led to the Crusades, which Mackinder considers the beginning of Europe’s collective modern history.

Russia, meanwhile, though protected by forest glades against many a rampaging host, nevertheless fell prey in the 13th century to the Golden Horde of the Mongols. These invaders decimated and subsequently changed Russia. But because most of Europe knew no such level of destruction, it was able to emerge as the world’s political cockpit, while Russia was largely denied access to the European Renaissance. The ultimate land-based empire, with few natural barriers against invasion, Russia would know forevermore what it was like to be brutally conquered. As a result, it would become perennially obsessed with expanding and holding territory.

Key discoveries of the Columbian epoch, Mackinder writes, only reinforced the cruel facts of geography. In the Middle Ages, the peoples of Europe were largely confined to the land. But when the sea route to India was found around the Cape of Good Hope, Europeans suddenly had access to the entire rimland of southern Asia, to say nothing of strategic discoveries in the New World. While Western Europeans “covered the ocean with their fleets,” Mackinder tells us, Russia was expanding equally impressively on land, “emerging from her northern forests” to police the steppe with her Cossacks, sweeping into Siberia, and sending peasants to sow the southwestern steppe with wheat. It was an old story: Europe versus Russia, a liberal sea power (like Athens and Venice) against a reactionary land power (like Sparta and Prussia). For the sea, beyond the cosmopolitan influences it bestows by virtue of access to distant harbors, provides the inviolate border security that democracy needs to take root.

In the 19th century, Mackinder notes, the advent of steam engines and the creation of the Suez Canal increased the mobility of European sea power around the southern rim of Eurasia, just as railways were beginning to do the same for land power in the Eurasian heartland. So the struggle was set for the mastery of Eurasia, bringing Mackinder to his thesis:

As we consider this rapid review of the broader currents of history, does not a certain persistence of geographical relationship become evident? Is not the pivot region of the world’s politics that vast area of Euro-Asia which is inaccessible to ships, but in antiquity lay open to the horse-riding nomads, and is to-day about to be covered with a network of railways?

Just as the Mongols banged at, and often broke down, the gates to the marginal regions surrounding Eurasia, Russia would now play the same conquering role, for as Mackinder writes, “the geographical quantities in the calculation are more measurable and more nearly constant than the human.” Forget the czars and the commissars-yet-to-be in 1904; they are but trivia compared with the deeper tectonic forces of geography.

Mackinder’s determinism prepared us for the rise of the Soviet Union and its vast zone of influence in the second half of the 20th century, as well as for the two world wars preceding it. After all, as historian Paul Kennedy notes, these conflicts were struggles over Mackinder’s “marginal” regions, running from Eastern Europe to the Himalayas and beyond. Cold War containment strategy, moreover, depended heavily on rimland bases across the greater Middle East and the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the U.S. projection of power into Afghanistan and Iraq, and today’s tensions with Russia over the political fate of Central Asia and the Caucasus have only bolstered Mackinder’s thesis. In his article’s last paragraph, Mackinder even raises the specter of Chinese conquests of the “pivot” area, which would make China the dominant geopolitical power. Look at how Chinese migrants are now demographically claiming parts of Siberia as Russia’s political control of its eastern reaches is being strained. One can envision Mackinder’s being right yet again.

The wisdom of geographical determinism endures across the chasm of a century because it recognizes that the most profound struggles of humanity are not about ideas but about control over territory, specifically the heartland and rimlands of Eurasia. Of course, ideas matter, and they span geography. And yet there is a certain geographic logic to where certain ideas take hold. Communist Eastern Europe, Mongolia, China, and North Korea were all contiguous to the great land power of the Soviet Union. Classic fascism was a predominantly European affair. And liberalism nurtured its deepest roots in the United States and Great Britain, essentially island nations and sea powers both. Such determinism is easy to hate but hard to dismiss.

To discern where the battle of ideas will lead, we must revise Mackinder for our time. After all, Mackinder could not foresee how a century’s worth of change would redefine—and enhance—the importance of geography in today’s world. One author who did is Yale University professor Paul Bracken, who in 1999 published Fire in the East. Bracken draws a conceptual map of Eurasia defined by the collapse of time and distance and the filling of empty spaces. This idea leads him to declare a “crisis of room.” In the past, sparsely populated geography acted as a safety mechanism. Yet this is no longer the case, Bracken argues, for as empty space increasingly disappears, the very “finite size of the earth” becomes a force for instability. And as I learned at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, “attrition of the same adds up to big change.”

One force that is shrinking the map of Eurasia is technology, particularly the military applications of it and the rising power it confers on states. In the early Cold War, Asian militaries were mostly lumbering, heavy forces whose primary purpose was national consolidation. They focused inward. But as national wealth accumulated and the computer revolution took hold, Asian militaries from the oil-rich Middle East to the tiger economies of the Pacific developed full-fledged, military-civilian postindustrial complexes, with missiles and fiber optics and satellite phones. These states also became bureaucratically more cohesive, allowing their militaries to focus outward, toward other states. Geography in Eurasia, rather than a cushion, was becoming a prison from which there was no escape.

Now there is an “unbroken belt of countries,” in Bracken’s words, from Israel to North Korea, which are developing ballistic missiles and destructive arsenals. A map of these countries’ missile ranges shows a series of overlapping circles: Not only is no one safe, but a 1914-style chain reaction leading to wider war is easily conceivable. “The spread of missiles and weapons of mass destruction in Asia is like the spread of the six-shooter in the American Old West,” Bracken writes—a cheap, deadly equalizer of states.

The other force driving the revenge of geography is population growth, which makes the map of Eurasia more claustrophobic still. In the 1990s, many intellectuals viewed the 18th-century English philosopher Thomas Malthus as an overly deterministic thinker because he treated humankind as a species reacting to its physical environment, not a body of autonomous individuals. But as the years pass, and world food and energy prices fluctuate, Malthus is getting more respect. If you wander through the slums of Karachi or Gaza, which wall off multitudes of angry lumpen faithful—young men mostly—one can easily see the conflicts over scarce resources that Malthus predicted coming to pass. In three decades covering the Middle East, I have watched it evolve from a largely rural society to a realm of teeming megacities. In the next 20 years, the Arab world’s population will nearly double while supplies of groundwater will diminish.

A Eurasia of vast urban areas, overlapping missile ranges, and sensational media will be one of constantly enraged crowds, fed by rumors transported at the speed of light from one Third World megalopolis to another. So in addition to Malthus, we will also hear much about Elias Canetti, the 20th-century philosopher of crowd psychology: the phenomenon of a mass of people abandoning their individuality for an intoxicating collective symbol. It is in the cities of Eurasia principally where crowd psychology will have its greatest geopolitical impact. Alas, ideas do matter. And it is the very compression of geography that will provide optimum breeding grounds for dangerous ideologies and channels for them to spread.

All of this requires major revisions to Mackinder’s theories of geopolitics. For as the map of Eurasia shrinks and fills up with people, it not only obliterates the artificial regions of area studies; it also erases Mackinder’s division of Eurasia into a specific “pivot” and adjacent “marginal” zones. Military assistance from China and North Korea to Iran can cause Israel to take military actions. The U.S. Air Force can attack landlocked Afghanistan from Diego Garcia, an island in the middle of the Indian Ocean. The Chinese and Indian navies can project power from the Gulf of Aden to the South China Sea—out of their own regions and along the whole rimland. In short, contra Mackinder, Eurasia has been reconfigured into an organic whole.

The map’s new seamlessness can be seen in the Pakistani outpost of Gwadar. There, on the Indian Ocean, near the Iranian border, the Chinese have constructed a spanking new deep-water port. Land prices are booming, and people talk of this still sleepy fishing village as the next Dubai, which may one day link towns in Central Asia to the burgeoning middle-class fleshpots of India and China through pipelines, supertankers, and the Strait of Malacca. The Chinese also have plans for developing other Indian Ocean ports in order to transport oil by pipelines directly into western and central China, even as a canal and land bridge are possibly built across Thailand’s Isthmus of Kra. Afraid of being outflanked by the Chinese, the Indians are expanding their own naval ports and strengthening ties with both Iran and Burma, where the Indian-Chinese rivalry will be fiercest.

These deepening connections are transforming the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Indian and Pacific oceans into a vast continuum, in which the narrow and vulnerable Strait of Malacca will be the Fulda Gap of the 21st century. The fates of the Islamic Middle East and Islamic Indonesia are therefore becoming inextricable. But it is the geographic connections, not religious ones, that matter most.

This new map of Eurasia—tighter, more integrated, and more crowded—will be even less stable than Mackinder thought. Rather than heartlands and marginal zones that imply separateness, we will have a series of inner and outer cores that are fused together through mass politics and shared paranoia. In fact, much of Eurasia will eventually be as claustrophobic as Israel and the Palestinian territories, with geography controlling everything and no room to maneuver. Although Zionism shows the power of ideas, the battle over land between Israelis and Palestinians is a case of utter geographical determinism. This is Eurasia’s future as well.

The ability of states to control events will be diluted, in some cases destroyed. Artificial borders will crumble and become more fissiparous, leaving only rivers, deserts, mountains, and other enduring facts of geography. Indeed, the physical features of the landscape may be the only reliable guides left to understanding the shape of future conflict. Like rifts in the Earth’s crust that produce physical instability, there are areas in Eurasia that are more prone to conflict than others. These “shatter zones” threaten to implode, explode, or maintain a fragile equilibrium. And not surprisingly, they fall within that unstable inner core of Eurasia: the greater Middle East, the vast way station between the Mediterranean world and the Indian subcontinent that registers all the primary shifts in global power politics.

This inner core, for Mackinder, was the ultimate unstable region. And yet, writing in an age before oil pipelines and ballistic missiles, he saw this region as inherently volatile, geographically speaking, but also somewhat of a secondary concern. A century’s worth of technological advancement and population explosion has rendered the greater Middle East no less volatile but dramatically more relevant, and where Eurasia is most prone to fall apart now is in the greater Middle East’s several shatter zones.

The Indian subcontinent is one such shatter zone. It is defined on its landward sides by the hard geographic borders of the Himalayas to the north, the Burmese jungle to the east, and the somewhat softer border of the Indus River to the west. Indeed, the border going westward comes in three stages: the Indus; the unruly crags and canyons that push upward to the shaved wastes of Central Asia, home to the Pashtun tribes; and, finally, the granite, snow-mantled massifs of the Hindu Kush, transecting Afghanistan itself. Because these geographic impediments are not contiguous with legal borders, and because barely any of India’s neighbors are functional states, the current political organization of the subcontinent should not be taken for granted. You see this acutely as you walk up to and around any of these land borders, the weakest of which, in my experience, are the official ones—a mere collection of tables where cranky bureaucrats inspect your luggage. Especially in the west, the only border that lives up to the name is the Hindu Kush, making me think that in our own lifetimes the whole semblance of order in Pakistan and southeastern Afghanistan could unravel, and return, in effect, to vague elements of greater India.

In Nepal, the government barely controls the countryside where 85 percent of its people live. Despite the aura bequeathed by the Himalayas, nearly half of Nepal’s population lives in the dank and humid lowlands along the barely policed border with India. Driving throughout this region, it appears in many ways indistinguishable from the Ganges plain. If the Maoists now ruling Nepal cannot increase state capacity, the state itself could dissolve.

The same holds true for Bangladesh. Even more so than Nepal, it has no geographic defense to marshal as a state. The view from my window during a recent bus journey was of the same ruler-flat, aquatic landscape of paddy fields and scrub on both sides of the line with India. The border posts are disorganized, ramshackle affairs. This artificial blotch of territory on the Indian subcontinent could metamorphose yet again, amid the gale forces of regional politics, Muslim extremism, and nature itself.

Like Pakistan, no Bangladeshi government, military or civilian, has ever functioned even remotely well. Millions of Bangladeshi refugees have already crossed the border into India illegally. With 150 million people—a population larger than Russia—crammed together at sea level, Bangladesh is vulnerable to the slightest climatic variation, never mind the changes caused by global warming. Simply because of its geography, tens of millions of people in Bangladesh could be inundated with salt water, necessitating the mother of all humanitarian relief efforts. In the process, the state itself could collapse.

Of course, the worst nightmare on the subcontinent is Pakistan, whose dysfunction is directly the result of its utter lack of geographic logic. The Indus should be a border of sorts, but Pakistan sits astride both its banks, just as the fertile and teeming Punjab plain is bisected by the India-Pakistan border. Only the Thar Desert and the swamps to its south act as natural frontiers between Pakistan and India. And though these are formidable barriers, they are insufficient to frame a state composed of disparate, geographically based, ethnic groups—Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, and Pashtuns—for whom Islam has provided insufficient glue to hold them together. All the other groups in Pakistan hate the Punjabis and the army they control, just as the groups in the former Yugoslavia hated the Serbs and the army they controlled. Pakistan’s raison d’être is that it supposedly provides a homeland for subcontinental Muslims, but 154 million of them, almost the same number as the entire population of Pakistan, live over the border in India.

To the west, the crags and canyons of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, bordering Afghanistan, are utterly porous. Of all the times I crossed the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, I never did so legally. In reality, the two countries are inseparable. On both sides live the Pashtuns. The wide belt of territory between the Hindu Kush mountains and the Indus River is really Pashtunistan, an entity that threatens to emerge were Pakistan to fall apart. That would, in turn, lead to the dissolution of Afghanistan.

The Taliban constitute merely the latest incarnation of Pashtun nationalism. Indeed, much of the fighting in Afghanistan today occurs in Pashtunistan: southern and eastern Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan. The north of Afghanistan, beyond the Hindu Kush, has seen less fighting and is in the midst of reconstruction and the forging of closer links to the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, inhabited by the same ethnic groups that populate northern Afghanistan. Here is the ultimate world of Mackinder, of mountains and men, where the facts of geography are asserted daily, to the chagrin of U.S.-led forces—and of India, whose own destiny and borders are hostage to what plays out in the vicinity of the 20,000-foot wall of the Hindu Kush.

Another shatter zone is the Arabian Peninsula. The vast tract of land controlled by the Saudi royal family is synonymous with Arabia in the way that India is synonymous with the subcontinent. But while India is heavily populated throughout, Saudi Arabia constitutes a geographically nebulous network of oases separated by massive waterless tracts. Highways and domestic air links are crucial to Saudi Arabia’s cohesion. Though India is built on an idea of democracy and religious pluralism, Saudi Arabia is built on loyalty to an extended family. But while India is virtually surrounded by troubling geography and dysfunctional states, Saudi Arabia’s borders disappear into harmless desert to the north and are shielded by sturdy, well-governed, self-contained sheikhdoms to the east and southeast.

Where Saudi Arabia is truly vulnerable, and where the shatter zone of Arabia is most acute, is in highly populous Yemen to the south. Although it has only a quarter of Saudi Arabia’s land area, Yemen’s population is almost as large, so the all-important demographic core of the Arabian Peninsula is crammed into its mountainous southwest corner, where sweeping basalt plateaus, rearing up into sand-castle formations and volcanic plugs, embrace a network of oases densely inhabited since antiquity. Because the Turks and the British never really controlled Yemen, they did not leave behind the strong bureaucratic institutions that other former colonies inherited.

When I traveled the Saudi-Yemen border some years back, it was crowded with pickup trucks filled with armed young men, loyal to this sheikh or that, while the presence of the Yemeni government was negligible. Mud-brick battlements hid the encampments of these rebellious sheikhs, some with their own artillery. Estimates of the number of firearms in Yemen vary, but any Yemeni who wants a weapon can get one easily. Meanwhile, groundwater supplies will last no more than a generation or two.

I’ll never forget what a U.S. military expert told me in the capital, Sanaa: “Terrorism is an entrepreneurial activity, and in Yemen you’ve got over 20 million aggressive, commercial-minded, and well-armed people, all extremely hard-working compared with the Saudis next door. It’s the future, and it terrifies the hell out of the government in Riyadh.” The future of teeming, tribal Yemen will go a long way to determining the future of Saudi Arabia. And geography, not ideas, has everything to do with it.

The Fertile Crescent, wedged between the Mediterranean Sea and the Iranian plateau, constitutes another shatter zone. The countries of this region—Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq—are vague geographic expressions that had little meaning before the 20th century. When the official lines on the map are removed, we find a crude finger-painting of Sunni and Shiite clusters that contradict national borders. Inside these borders, the governing authorities of Lebanon and Iraq barely exist. The one in Syria is tyrannical and fundamentally unstable; the one in Jordan is rational but under quiet siege. (Jordan’s main reason for being at all is to act as a buffer for other Arab regimes that fear having a land border with Israel.) Indeed, the Levant is characterized by tired authoritarian regimes and ineffective democracies.

Of all the geographically illogical states in the Fertile Crescent, none is more so than Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s tyranny, by far the worst in the Arab world, was itself geographically determined: Every Iraqi dictator going back to the first military coup in 1958 had to be more repressive than the previous one just to hold together a country with no natural borders that seethes with ethnic and sectarian consciousness. The mountains that separate Kurdistan from the rest of Iraq, and the division of the Mesopotamian plain between Sunnis in the center and Shiites in the south, may prove more pivotal to Iraq’s stability than the yearning after the ideal of democracy. If democracy doesn’t in fairly short order establish sturdy institutional roots, Iraq’s geography will likely lead it back to tyranny or anarchy again.

But for all the recent focus on Iraq, geography and history tell us that Syria might be at the real heart of future turbulence in the Arab world. Aleppo in northern Syria is a bazaar city with greater historical links to Mosul, Baghdad, and Anatolia than to Damascus. Whenever Damascus’s fortunes declined with the rise of Baghdad to the east, Aleppo recovered its greatness. Wandering through the souks of Aleppo, it is striking how distant and irrelevant Damascus seems: The bazaars are dominated by Kurds, Turks, Circassians, Arab Christians, Armenians, and others, unlike the Damascus souk, which is more a world of Sunni Arabs. As in Pakistan and the former Yugoslavia, each sect and religion in Syria has a specific location. Between Aleppo and Damascus is the increasingly Islamist Sunni heartland. Between Damascus and the Jordanian border are the Druse, and in the mountain stronghold contiguous with Lebanon are the Alawites—both remnants of a wave of Shiism from Persia and Mesopotamia that swept over Syria a thousand years ago.

Elections in Syria in 1947, 1949, and 1954 exacerbated these divisions by polarizing the vote along sectarian lines. The late Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970 after 21 changes of government in 24 years. For three decades, he was the Leonid Brezhnev of the Arab world, staving off the future by failing to build a civil society at home. His son Bashar will have to open the political system eventually, if only to keep pace with a dynamically changing society armed with satellite dishes and the Internet. But no one knows how stable a post-authoritarian Syria would be. Policymakers must fear the worst. Yet a post-Assad Syria may well do better than post-Saddam Iraq, precisely because its tyranny has been much less severe. Indeed, traveling from Saddam’s Iraq to Assad’s Syria was like coming up for air.

In addition to its inability to solve the problem of political legitimacy, the Arab world is unable to secure its own environment. The plateau peoples of Turkey will dominate the Arabs in the 21st century because the Turks have water and the Arabs don’t. Indeed, to develop its own desperately poor southeast and thereby suppress Kurdish separatism, Turkey will need to divert increasingly large amounts of the Euphrates River from Syria and Iraq. As the Middle East becomes a realm of parched urban areas, water will grow in value relative to oil. The countries with it will retain the ability—and thus the power—to blackmail those without it. Water will be like nuclear energy, thereby making desalinization and dual-use power facilities primary targets of missile strikes in future wars. Not just in the West Bank, but everywhere there is less room to maneuver.

A final shatter zone is the Persian core, stretching from the Caspian Sea to Iran’s north to the Persian Gulf to its south. Virtually all of the greater Middle East’s oil and natural gas lies in this region. Just as shipping lanes radiate from the Persian Gulf, pipelines are increasingly radiating from the Caspian region to the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, China, and the Indian Ocean. The only country that straddles both energy-producing areas is Iran, as Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy note in Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East. The Persian Gulf possesses 55 percent of the world’s crude-oil reserves, and Iran dominates the whole gulf, from the Shatt al-Arab on the Iraqi border to the Strait of Hormuz in the southeast—a coastline of 1,317 nautical miles, thanks to its many bays, inlets, coves, and islands that offer plenty of excellent places for hiding tanker-ramming speedboats.

It is not an accident that Iran was the ancient world’s first superpower. There was a certain geographic logic to it. Iran is the greater Middle East’s universal joint, tightly fused to all of the outer cores. Its border roughly traces and conforms to the natural contours of the landscape—plateaus to the west, mountains and seas to the north and south, and desert expanse in the east toward Afghanistan. For this reason, Iran has a far more venerable record as a nation-state and urbane civilization than most places in the Arab world and all the places in the Fertile Crescent. Unlike the geographically illogical countries of that adjacent region, there is nothing artificial about Iran. Not surprisingly, Iran is now being wooed by both India and China, whose navies will come to dominate the Eurasian sea lanes in the 21st century.

Of all the shatter zones in the greater Middle East, the Iranian core is unique: The instability Iran will cause will not come from its implosion, but from a strong, internally coherent Iranian nation that explodes outward from a natural geographic platform to shatter the region around it. The security provided to Iran by its own natural boundaries has historically been a potent force for power projection. The present is no different. Through its uncompromising ideology and nimble intelligence services, Iran runs an unconventional, postmodern empire of substate entities in the greater Middle East: Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Sadrist movement in southern Iraq. If the geographic logic of Iranian expansion sounds eerily similar to that of Russian expansion in Mackinder’s original telling, it is.

The geography of Iran today, like that of Russia before, determines the most realistic strategy to securing this shatter zone: containment. As with Russia, the goal of containing Iran must be to impose pressure on the contradictions of the unpopular, theocratic regime in Tehran, such that it eventually changes from within. The battle for Eurasia has many, increasingly interlocking fronts. But the primary one is for Iranian hearts and minds, just as it was for those of Eastern Europeans during the Cold War. Iran is home to one of the Muslim world’s most sophisticated populations, and traveling there, one encounters less anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism than in Egypt. This is where the battle of ideas meets the dictates of geography.

***

In this century’s fight for Eurasia, like that of the last century, Mackinder’s axiom holds true: Man will initiate, but nature will control. Liberal universalism and the individualism of Isaiah Berlin aren’t going away, but it is becoming clear that the success of these ideas is in large measure bound and determined by geography. This was always the case, and it is harder to deny now, as the ongoing recession will likely cause the global economy to contract for the first time in six decades. Not only wealth, but political and social order, will erode in many places, leaving only nature’s frontiers and men’s passions as the main arbiters of that age-old question: Who can coerce whom? We thought globalization had gotten rid of this antiquarian world of musty maps, but now it is returning with a vengeance.

We all must learn to think like Victorians. That is what must guide and inform our newly rediscovered realism. Geographical determinists must be seated at the same honored table as liberal humanists, thereby merging the analogies of Vietnam and Munich. Embracing the dictates and limitations of geography will be especially hard for Americans, who like to think that no constraint, natural or otherwise, applies to them. But denying the facts of geography only invites disasters that, in turn, make us victims of geography.

Better, instead, to look hard at the map for ingenious ways to stretch the limits it imposes, which will make any support for liberal principles in the world far more effective. Amid the revenge of geography, that is the essence of realism and the crux of wise policymaking—working near the edge of what is possible, without slipping into the precipice.

Robert D. Kaplan is national correspondent for The Atlantic and senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

All the Book's a Stage by Michael Dirda


All the Book's a Stage by Michael Dirda
Thursday, March 12, 2009; C04

A STRANGE EVENTFUL HISTORY
The Dramatic Lives of Ellen Terry, Henry Irving, and Their Remarkable Families
By Michael Holroyd

Farrar Straus Giroux. 620 pp. $40

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Henry Irving (1838-1905) and Ellen Terry (1847-1928) reigned as the king and queen of the English stage.

Terry, said Irving's longtime manager, "moved through the world of the theatre like embodied sunshine." As a young woman, she was painted by such Victorian eminences as Whistler, John Singer Sargent and the once equally celebrated G.F. Watts (to whom she was briefly married, albeit without any of what that hypersensitive painter euphemistically called "violent love"). As Mrs. Watts, she visited the poet Tennyson, at whose house, Farringford, she was immortalized by Julia Margaret Cameron in what has been called one of the "most beautiful and remarkable pictures in the history of photography." Playwright George Bernard Shaw professed his undying passion for her -- but preferred to conduct their love affair entirely by letter. They didn't meet for years. So great was her fame and beauty that young men would say to their sweethearts: "As there's no chance of Ellen Terry marrying me, will you?"

As for Irving: He was absolutely electrifying on the stage, a dark, magnetic presence that drew all eyes, whether he was Hamlet or Shylock, Mephistopheles or Thomas à Becket. He even served as the partial model for the charismatic protagonist of an 1897 "shocker" written by that above-mentioned stage manager, one Bram Stoker: It was called "Dracula." Known as "the Chief" to his well-paid staff and company at the Lyceum Theatre, Irving became the first actor ever to be knighted.

In this group biography of Terry, Irving and their families, Michael Holroyd -- well known for his lives of Lytton Strachey and Shaw -- has produced the most completely delicious, the most civilized and the most wickedly entertaining work of nonfiction anyone could ask for. I have no particular interest in theatrical history, but Holroyd's verve -- his dramatic sense for the comic and the tragic -- is irresistible. The book's chapters are pleasingly short, its prose crisp and fast-moving, and every page is packed with bizarre doings, eccentric characters, surprising factoids and a stream of lively and scandalous anecdotes.

Terry came from an acting family. Her parents were roving showmen, and nearly all the children were expected to tread the boards. Ellen's older sister Kate was the first "Terry of the age" but gave up her career to marry. At her last, thunderously acclaimed performance as Juliet, the specially commissioned "Kate Terry Valse" was played at the command of the Prince of Wales. In her dressing room afterward her wealthy fiance presented her with a wide gold bracelet. "On the outside was engraved: 'To Kate Terry on her retirement from the stage, from him for whom she leaves it'; and on the inside, in tiny letters, were the titles of a hundred plays in which she had appeared." She was all of 23.

But this was nothing compared with the eventual fame of Ellen. At the Grand Jubilee for her 50 years onstage -- held at the Drury Lane Theatre on June 12, 1906 -- the guests included many of the most famous performers of the era: the immortal Eleonora Duse, W.S. Gilbert (of Gilbert and Sullivan), Réjane (the rival of Ellen's friend Sarah Bernhardt), Coquelin of the Comédie Française, the notorious Lillie Langtry, the actor-manager Herbert Beerbohm Tree, Mrs. Patrick Campbell (for whom Shaw wrote the part of Eliza Doolittle) and Enrico Caruso. That night 22 members of the Terry family appeared onstage, including Ellen's brother Fred, who gained world renown playing Sir Percy Blakeney, better known as "The Scarlet Pimpernel." Alas, Holroyd doesn't say if sister Kate's 2-year-old grandson was there, a young fellow by the name of John Gielgud.

While Ellen Terry grew up in the theater, Irving, by contrast, spent his childhood in a mining village in Cornwall. But John Brodribb was determined to become an actor, so he changed his name, then spent an arduous decade taking any part he could wangle with provincial acting companies. For years he was mocked for his accent, his occasional stammer, his shortsightedness and his odd "dragging gait." But the young man was indomitable. As Holroyd writes: "His apprenticeship, and then his career, became an unending struggle to master his faults in diction, to manipulate the mobile features that were evolving from a rather ordinary face and, in short, to gain perfection. By the time this apprenticeship was over and he established himself in London, he had played more than 700 characters."

Irving -- prey to melancholy and anxiety when not working -- lived for the limelight. One evening, when he was just starting his London career, the shrew he had impetuously married suddenly asked: "Are you going on making a fool of yourself like this all your life?" Irving immediately stopped the carriage in which they were riding, got out and walked off into the night. Though they never divorced, he never saw his wife again. Even Terry -- his leading lady and probably his lover -- once told him flat out "that if she suddenly dropped dead, his first emotion would be grief and his first question would be about the preparedness of her understudy -- and he did not disagree."

While Henry Irving worked hard to develop his skills, Terry was a natural, full of fun and flirtatious -- "an April kind of woman." After her annulment, she ran off with an aesthete by whom she had two illegitimate children; at the age of 60 she impetuously married a man half her age. She had little or no financial sense, and exhausted much of her fortune bailing out her two children, Edy and Ted.

These two, along with Irving's sons Harry and Laurence, form the focus of the second half of "A Strange and Eventful History." All four managed to break free of their parents and make names for themselves in the theater. Harry created the role of the radical butler in J.M. Barrie's "The Admirable Crichton." His wife, Dolly, played the original Trilby in the drama that gave us that hypnotic villain Svengali. (In later life she took the part of Mrs. Darling in a kind of children's fairy tale that no one thought would last: "Peter Pan.") Laurence, with his wife, Mabel, toured the world playing in Shaw's "Captain Brassbound's Conversion." He also once wrote a play called "Godefroi and Yolande," which deserves immortality if only for the scene direction: "Enter a chorus of lepers."

But Irving's sons died in middle age, while Ellen's children, who adopted the last name Craig, lived into the middle of the past century. When not running errands and nursing her mother, Edith Craig designed costumes, worked hard for suffragism and was a member of a lesbian circle that included the novelists Radclyffe Hall and Vita Sackville-West. Her brother, Edward Gordon Craig, grew up to become a visionary stage designer. Having inherited his mother's attractiveness and his godfather Henry Irving's charisma, Gordon Craig used them to wangle financial support from hapless patrons, charm the great Russian director Konstantin Stanislavski and seduce the famous dancer Isadora Duncan, by whom he had a daughter. Before his death at 94, this feckless Svengali fathered at least 13 children by eight different women. Holroyd paints him, with devastating irony, as a sacred monster, undeniably talented but wholly self-centered.

As the years and pages go by in "A Strange Eventful History," this long biography starts to feel increasingly Proustian: Here is the flow of life, as one generation passes into the next, as men and women struggle for fame and achievement, then surprisingly find that they have grown old. Henry Irving, who wanted to go "like that," returned one night to his hotel after a performance, slumped down in a chair and died. Ellen lingered into her 80s: "The days are so short -- I wake in the morning -- I meet a little misery -- I meet a little happiness -- I fight with one -- I greet the other -- the day is gone." And toward his end, Gordon Craig told visitors, "I was very honoured when our Queen made me . . . whatever it was." Enough. "A Strange Eventful History" is a wonderful book, deserving applause, bouquets and a rave review in this morning's paper.

Michael Dirda -- mdirda@gmail.com